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Abstract 
People cooperate with others on a daily basis. These collaborations can be disrupted by 
defection, self-interest or unfair behaviours of others, which is opposing cooperative social 
norms. People tend to punish these individuals. What exactly underlies this punishment 
behaviour? 
 The enforcement of cooperative behaviour is facilitated through emotional 
mechanisms. Especially anger has been shown to facilitate individuals’ tendency to punish. 
Unfair behaviour induces anger, which in turn is a predictor of punishment behaviour.  
 Anger thus seems to be the underlying factor. There are, however, boundary 
conditions under which anger leads to punishment behaviour. One of these conditions is 
related to the attention given to the emotion. Low mental resources seem to both decrease and 
increase emotion experience. We investigated whether timing of the depletion of mental 
resources affect an emotion and subsequently punishment behaviour. More specifically, we 
hypothesized that high cognitive load during the emotion activation phase leads to less 
punishment behaviour compared to low cognitive load. In addition, we hypothesized that high 
cognitive load during the emotion application phase leads to more punishment behaviour. 
 We investigated our hypotheses in an economic game based on the Dictator Game. In 
this two-player game, participants were confronted with the decision of another player about 
the distribution of a sum of money between this player and the participant. We manipulated 
both timing (activation phase vs. application phase) and occupation of working memory (high 
load vs. low load).  
 The results of the study showed that the link between unfairness, anger and 
punishment behaviour is strongly evident. The impact of the timing of cognitive load is not 
found to be significant. We can conclude that behaviour of people in joint ventures, in which 
people are placed against each other, can be influenced by the experience of unfairness of the 
situation and the amount of attention they have for the task.  
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Section 1. Introduction 
Cooperation between people happens on a daily basis, in small and large groups, in order to 
achieve common goals or reputation gain. Yet, cooperation is also frequent among strangers, 
in non-repeated interactions, including situations where gain of reputation is small or absent. 
This large-scale cooperation among strangers is typical for human societies, and is mainly 
based on social norms (Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2004).  
 Social norms are standards of behaviour that are based on widely shared beliefs how 
individual group members ought to behave in a given situation (Elster, 1989; Horne, 2001; 
Ellickson, 2001; Voss, 2001). For example, research suggests that human cooperation is 
largely based on the social norm of ‘conditional’ cooperation. This means that people are only 
willing to cooperate if others cooperate, and defection of others is a legitimate excuse for 
individual defection (Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2004). Defection, self-interested and unfair 
behaviour of individuals, are considered to oppose social norms, and can cause a complete 
breakdown of existing collaborations. In these situations, people often have the tendency to 
punish non-cooperators, even when this comes to a cost to themselves (Fehr, & Gächter, 
2002).  
 The possibility of punishing the non-cooperator increases cooperation, and 
cooperation decreases when this option is not available (Fehr, & Gächter, 2002), suggesting 
that punishment is indeed an effective measure. Third-party punishment experiments have 
shown that the desire to punish others when norm violations take place, can be strong enough 
to overcome the third party’s self-interest. Thus, people are willing to pay for punishment 
(e.g., in terms of money or effort), even though there are no direct benefits from punishing the 
non-cooperative other for the self (Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2004; Kahneman, 1986; Turillo, 
Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). These third-party punishment experiments clearly 
show the strength and existence of cooperative norms and costly punishment behaviour. What 
underlies this punishment behaviour of individuals, that follows the violation of cooperative 
social norms of others? 
 The enforcement of cooperative behaviour is facilitated through emotional 
mechanisms. For example, a recent study endorsed the important role of negative emotions in 
motivating the punishment of free riders (Fehr, & Gächter, 2002). Results suggests that free 
riding causes strong negative emotions, and in turn, negative emotions trigger punishment. 
The more the free rider deviates from the average investment of the other group members, the 
more he or she will be punished. These negative emotions are found to be the proximate cause 
of the punishment, because negative emotions became more intense as the free rider deviated 
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further from the average investement of others (Fehr, & Gächter, 2002). In particular, the 
emotion anger has been shown to influence punishment behaviour. Unfair behaviour induces 
anger, and there is a positive correlation between the amount of anger and the change on the 
use of punishment (Bosman, & van Winden, 2002). Finally, research has shown that 
individuals indeed experience the emotion anger in response to unfair behaviour of others, 
and this anger is accompanied by the tendency to retaliate against the defector (Seip, Van 
Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2014), further supporting the relation between anger and punishment 
behaviour. The tendency to attack others because of their unfair behaviour is a typical 
characteristic of the emotion anger (Lazarus, 1991), and can be triggered through unfairness 
for various reasons. The first reason could be that the punisher tries to correct the unfair 
outcome. Second, punishment is used as an attempt to correct the behaviour of the defector. 
The last reason to punish could simply be to harm the defector, as anger induced punishment 
has shown to give pleasure to the punisher (de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, 
Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). 
1.1 Attention and emotion 
The above thus suggests that anger drives punishment, especially in reaction to unfairness. 
There are, however, boundary conditions under which an emotion leads to certain behavioural 
responses. Research has shown that this depends on the attention given to the emotion. The 
subjective experience of emotions requires mental resources, as research suggests that 
affective states occupies working memory (Erber, & Tesser, 1992; Van Dillen, & Koole, 
2007). For example, cognitively demanding tasks, such as solving math problems (Erber, & 
Tesser, 1992; Van Dillen, & Koole, 2007), reading sentences (Morrow, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990), or even thinking about affect (Kron, Schul, Cohen, & Hassin, 2010), can reduce a 
range of affective experiences, including negative affect (Morrow, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; 
Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009), and anger (Gerin, 2006; Rusting, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998), and in turn influences the judgement and decision behaviour of people. 
Furthermore, incidental anger increases punishment of unfair interactions but only when there 
is enough attention to process the emotion (Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-
Perez, 2016). This suggests that anger increases punishment, only when there are enough 
mental resources. On the other hand, research has shown that low mental resources also 
increase punishment behaviour of unfair interactions. Individuals who were more impulsive 
had a stronger tendency to punish proposers who made unfair offers (Crockett, Clark, 
Lieberman, Tabibnia, & Robbins, 2010). Punishment behaviour is seen as an impulsive act 
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driven primarily by emotional reactions to perceived unfairness (Koenigs, & Tranel, 2007; 
Pillutla, & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia, 
Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). Punishment thus seems to be driven by a lack of self-regulation 
of negative emotions.  
 Indeed research has shown that people are more influenced by their emotions when 
mental recourses are limited. Schmeichel, Volokhov and Demaree (2008) investigated the 
relation between the experience of emotions and individual differences in working memory 
capacity. They found that participants with high working memory capacity were better able at 
suppressing their expressed negative and positive emotions than participants with low 
working memory capacity. Moreover, participants with high working memory capacity were 
more capable to appraise emotional stimuli in an unemotional manner and thereby 
experienced (Studies 3 and 4) and expressed (Study 4) less emotion in response to those 
stimuli.  
1.2 Timing of attention 
Low mental resources thus seem to both decrease and increase emotion experience. 
We suggest that whether low mental resources affect an emotion depends on the timing of the 
low mental resources. Research on stereotypes has shown that cognitive busyness, which can 
be considered as an equivalent to working memory load (as the researchers describe it as 
being simultaneously involved in several cognitive resource-consuming tasks), decreases the 
likelihood that a particular stereotype will be activated but once the stereotype is activated it 
increases the likelihood that this stereotype will be applied (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). 
Following this line of reasoning, we argue that when depletion of working memory takes 
place during the emotion-evoking-situation (e.g. activation phase) the emotion will not be 
elicited and as a result this will not affect punishment behaviour. On the other hand, when 
depletion of working memory takes place after the emotion-evoking-situation (e.g., 
application phase) the emotion will already be elicited and as a result will facilitate 
punishment.  
1.3 Research questions 
The goal of this master thesis was to determine whether the timing of cognitive load (during 
or after) an unfair situation leads to different behavioural outcomes. More specifically, we 
hypothesized that high load during the emotion activation phase leads to less punishment 
behaviour compared to low load. In addition, we hypothesized that high load during the 
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emotion application phase leads to more punishment behaviour. To investigate the following 
research questions, an experimental (lab) study has been conducted: 
 H1: Cognitive depletion during the emotion activation phase will reduce punishment. 
 H2: Cognitive depletion during the emotion application phase will increase  
 punishment. 
1.4 The current study 
In the present research we investigated our hypotheses in an economic game based on the 
Dictator Game. In this two-player game, participants are confronted with the decision of 
another player about the distribution of a sum of money between this player and the 
participant. We experimentally manipulated the unfairness of the other player’s behaviour. 
The distribution of money served as a proximate for different levels of the other player’s 
unfair behaviour. Following the distribution of money, participants decide whether or not to 
punish the other player. We manipulated both the timing (activation phase vs. application 
phase) and occupation of working memory (high load vs. low load). We hypothesized that 
high load during the emotion activation phase will lead to less punishment compared to low 
load. Conversely, we hypothesized that high load during the emotion application phase will 
lead to more punishment. 
Section 2. Method 
2.1 Participants & design 
Two hundred students of the University of Leiden participated in exchange for a course credit 
or a financial reward of three euro. Participants were recruited at several buildings and 
faculties of the university. Most of the recruitment took place after lectures of first year 
students, because of the amount of attendees during these lectures. The language used in the 
study is Dutch; therefore it was a requirement that participants control the Dutch language on 
a high level. Another requirement of the participants was that they are year one psychology 
students or students from another study. In this way, an attempt was made to prevent 
knowledge of participants about this field of research to influence results. 
The study had a 3 (unfairness situation: mild/severe/very) within x 2 (load: low/high) 
between x 2 (phase: activation/application) between - subjects design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. The dependent variable is the degree of 
punishment behaviour. Demographics (nationality, age, gender, and highest completed 
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education) were measured at the end of the research. All procedures were approved by the 
ethical committee of Leiden University. 
2.2 Procedure 
At least four participants had been tested simultaneously in the laboratories of the university 
in Leiden. This approach was chosen deliberately, so the feeling was created that they actually 
played against other participants. The participants were seated at separate computer terminals, 
so that it was not possible to see or interact with each other during the research. The software 
which was used to conduct this study is programmed by the use of Qualtrics. First, the 
participants were asked to read and sign the consent. After the consent the participants 
received instructions for the game they would be participating in. Half of the participants were 
assigned to the activation phase condition, the other half were assigned to the application 
phase condition. Subsequently, participants in both conditions played three dictator games 
with a concurrent high load or a low load task. Participants were told that their opponents 
were seated in the other terminals and that they would play one game against three of them. In 
fact, every participant performed the experiment individually. All interactions in the games 
were computer-mediated and took place anonymously. In addition, the participants were told 
that they would receive a secondary task, which he/she would perform on his/her own and 
that this game focused on their capacity to remember digits. 
 At the end, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire to indicate their 
demographics. Also, two questions were included that focus on the task to remember digit(s), 
to indicate if they experienced the task as difficult and distracting (see below for more 
information on the manipulation). Then, participants were thanked for their participation and 
were asked to leave the computer terminal to collect their compensation. 
2.2.1 Dictator games  
After participants were informed about the structure of the games, they were told that they 
were assigned to the role of the player B in all games and that in each game they were paired 
with another player A, who was assigned to the role of dictator. In each game, player A had to 
choose from two options how to devide €10 between him – or herself and player B. All 
decisions of player A were pre-programmed, whereas B’s decisions were made by 
participants. Participants were confronted with a slightly unfair, quite unfair and very unfair 
distribution (see Figure 1a). The order in which these distributions were presented was 
random. 
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A slightly unfair division presented the participants with a distribution of 6/4 (i.e., 6 
for A and 4 for B), a quite unfair division presented them with a distribution of 7/3 (i.e., 7 for 
A and 3 for B), and a very unfair division presented them with a distribution of 9/1 (i.e., 9 for 
A and 1 for B). The unfair distributions were paired with fair distributions (i.e., 5 for A and 5 
for B), that were never chosen by A (see Figure 1b). The visual display of the distributions 
was introduced to contribute to the experience of the participant that the distribution chosen 
by the opponent was a (slightly/quite/very) unfair act, in comparison to the equal choice 
option which the opponent did not choose (Will, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2015). Participants thus 
played three games in total. After participants were presented with a decision of A, they were 
given the opportunity to punish A.  
 
a     b  
Figure  1a. Possible choice scenarios of player A. 1b. Example of the visual display of the 
choice made by player A, in this case a slightly unfair distribution. 
2.2.2 Punishment  
Following each choice made by A, participants were given the opportunity to punish A by 
determining the amount of minutes player A had to stay in the laboratory to perform an 
additional task. This was an annoying task, in which a person was asked to score out the letter 
‘e’ in a text, in case this letter was followed by a consonant. The range of minutes in each 
game was 0 – 15 minutes, where 0 minutes means no additional task for player A and 15 
minutes is the highest possible punishment. 
2.2.3 Cognitive load task 
In addition to the three games, a secondary task was performed. The participants were told 
that this task was individual, and that it measured their capability of remembering digits. Each 
participant was either in a low load- or a high load condition, and this condition then remained 
unchanged for all the three games. 
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Low load task. The participants in the low load condition were asked to remember ‘1’ 
in case of a slightly unfair distribution, ‘3’ in case of a quite unfair distribution, and ‘8’ in 
case of a severe unfair distribution. The order of the distributions, and therefore the order of 
the digits presented, was completely random. The participants were asked to type in the digit 
into the empty response field on the screen. 
High load task. The participants in the high load condition were asked to remember 
the following series of numbers in case of a slightly unfair distribution: ‘36957281’, in case of 
a quite unfair distribution this series was ‘82594132’, and in case of a severe unfair 
distribution the series of numbers was ‘71634928’. The order of the distributions, and 
therefore the order of the series of digits presented, was completely random. The participants 
were asked to type in the digit into the empty response field on the screen. 
 
2.2.4 Load manipulation check  
In order to measure the experienced load of the tasks, at the end of the study the participants 
were asked to indicate on a Likert scale (from 1: disagree, to 7: agree) to what extent they 
agreed with the following two statements: ‘I experienced it as difficult to remember the 
digits’, and ‘I was not distracted by memorizing the digits during the games’.  
 
2.2.5 Timing conditions  
In order to investigate whether the timing of cognitive depletion has an effect on punishment 
behaviour, the following conditions were also applied in the study: activation phase and 
appliction phase condition. The names of the conditions refer to the moment on which the 
cognitive load task is being performed (i.e., during the activation or application of the emotion 
anger). 
Activation phase condition. Following the instructions, in the activation phase 
condition, participants were asked to remember either one digit (low load) or eight digits 
(high load). Then, the game started and the distribution-choice made by player A was shown. 
Immediately after this distribution-choice, participants were asked to type in the digit(s) on 
the computer screen. Then, the participants were given the opportunity to punish A. This 
procedure was repeated, so the participant played three games in total.   
Application phase condition. In the application phase condition, participants first saw 
the distribution-choice of player A. After that, they were asked to remember either one digit 
(low load) or eight digits (high load). Then the participants were given the opportunity to 
punish A. After they made their punishment decision, participants were asked to type in the 
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digit(s) on the computer screen. Also for these participants the procedure was repeated, so the 
participant played three games in total.   
2.2.6 Emotion 
In order to measure the emotion anger, after each game participants were asked to indicate on 
a Likert scale (from 1: disagree, to 7: agree) to what extent they agreed with the following 
statements: ‘I think that the distribution of the 10 euros by player A is unfair’, ‘I am angry 
with player A’, ‘I am irritated by the behaviour of player A’, and ‘I feel satisfaction from 
punishing player A’. 
 The four statements were formulated in such a way, that they can be taken together as 
a mean indication of anger for each distribution. Whether the items actually measured the 
same construct and can be used as one (mean) variable, will be checked in advance through 
data analysis. 
Section 3. Results 
3.1 Participants 
A total of two hundred people participated in the study during two weeks in February at the 
laboratories of the university of Leiden. More women (N = 131, SD = .48) participated in the 
study than men. Age ranged from 18 to 32 years (M age = 20.18, SD = 2.40).  
Because of the language requirements, almost all the participants were Dutch (N = 
197), except for someone from China, Germany, and Iceland. These three people were able to 
read Dutch on a high level, as they stated during the recruitment process of the study. This, 
and the fact that most of the participants’ highest completed education was on secundairy 
school level (VWO: 72%, HAVO: 9%, and VMBO: 1.5%), can be explained by the second 
requirement that was imposed on the participants of this research (first year student 
psychology, or other studies). Other participants already completed an education at the 
university (11%), HBO (4.5%), MBO (1.5%), and one person did not answer this question. 
3.2 Load manipulation check 
In the study, two questions were included to verify that the participants experienced the high 
load task as more difficult and distracting than the low load task. The first question, ‘I 
experienced it as difficult to remember the digits’, was reverse coded into a new variable. 
Subsequently, the correlation was measured between the two items. Because this correlation 
was only medium-sized, r = .332, p < .01, two separate two-way analyses of variance were 
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performed to measure if the experienced difficulty and distraction significantly differed 
between the participants with a low load vs. a high load task. 
 On average, participants who had been given the low load task, experienced the task as 
less difficult (M = 6.52, SE = 1.08), than participants who were given the high load task (M = 
3.33, SE = 1.56). This difference was significant, F (1, 196) = 281.90, p < 0.001, and 
represented a large effect; Cohen’s d = 2.38, r = .77. The proportion of the variance of the 
experienced difficulty of the task, can be explained for 59% by the load condition. The 
analysis showed no significant effect for phase (timing of the load) or interaction effect, all ps 
> .45. 
 The same procedure is performed to verify that participants experienced the distraction 
of the load task differently, in case of performing the low load vs. the high load task. On 
average, participants who had been given the low load task, experienced the task as less 
distracting (M = 4.77, SE = 2.22), than participants who were given the high load task (M = 
3.45, SE = 1.74). This difference was significant F (1, 196) = 21.78, p < 0.001. This 
represented a medium effect; Cohen’s d = .66, and r = .31. Nevertheless, the proportion in the 
variance of the reported distraction explained by the load condition was low (9%). The two-
way analysis of variance with phase and load condition as factors and reported distraction as 
dependent variable, showed no significant effect for phase or interaction effect, all ps > .07. 
3.3 Digit span performance 
In addition to the perception of difficulty and distraction, the actual performance on this task 
was also measured. Participants were asked to enter the digit(s) on the screen, which they had 
to remember during the games. Through analyzing their accuracy scores, we can verify that 
the high load task was more difficult than the low load task.  
The amount of incorrect digit(s) that the participants entered were calculated for each 
game. If the answer was correct, the participant received a zero. If one digit was incorrect, the 
participant received a one, with a maximum sumscore of eight (high load task consisted of a 
series of eight numbers). Sequences errors were not taken into account, because the 
calculation of the error scores would be too complicated. The current method seemed to be 
the most reliable way to calculate the errors for each participant. 
A repeated measures ANOVA is performed, with Mistakes variables (three levels: 
distributions) as within-subjects factors, and load (two levels: low/high) as between-subjects 
factors. Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was significant (p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction is applied. There was a statistically significant main effect of distribution 
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on the amount of mistakes, F(1.869, 370.124) = 5.27, p < .01. Thus, the unfairness of the 
distribution significantly affected the amount of mistakes participants made on the load task. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the highest amount of mistakes were made in case of the 
unfair distribution (M = 1.29, SD = 2.24), followed by the slightly unfair distribution (M = 
.83, SD = 1.72, p < .01), and the lowest amount of mistakes were made in case of the quite 
unfair distribution (M = .92, SD = 1.64, p < .05).  
The interaction effect between distribution and load condition on the amount of 
mistakes was also significant, F(1.869, 370.124) = 5.03, p < .01. The most mistakes were 
made in the high load condition in the severe unfair distribution, and distribution had only an 
effect in the high load conditions. 
Phase showed no significant result, p > .76. Thus, the timing of the load condition had 
no significant effect on the amount of mistakes the participants made during the load task. 
3.4 Anger in response to distribution unfairness 
Four statements were introduced in the study to measure the experienced anger by the 
participants after each distribution of unfairness (e.g., games). A reliability analysis is 
performed on the four items per distribution, and as a consequence of the high internal 
consistences (slightly unfair distribution: α = .792, quite unfair distribution: α = .796, severe unfair 
distribution: α = .789), the four items were computed into a new variable per distribution: 
“Mean Anger”.  
 Subsequently, a mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with the “Mean 
Anger” variables as within-subjects factors, and load (e.g., low / high) and phase (e.g., 
activation / application) as between-subjects factors. Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was 
significant (p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is applied. 
There was a statistically significant main effect of distribution on anger, F(1.681, 
329.501) = 253.68, p < .001. The results of the pairwise comparisons showed that the mean 
reported anger after the slightly unfair distribution (M = 3.27, SD = .09, p < .001) was less 
than the reported anger after the quite unfair distribution (M = 3.95, SD = .10, p < .001), and 
the mean reported anger was the highest after the severe unfair distribution (M = 4.59, SD = 
.10, p < .001). Thus, the more the distribution got unfair, the more anger the participants 
reported.  
The interaction between the effects of distribution and load on anger was also 
siginificant, F(1.681, 329.501) = 3.27, p < .05. The results of the pairwise comparisons 
showed that the load conditions only differed in case of the slightly unfair distribution, with 
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more reported anger in the low load condition (M = 3.40, SD = .13, p < .05), and than in the 
high load condition (M = 3.13, SD = .13, p < .05). 
Phase showed no significant results in the model, ps > .17. Therefore, the timing of the 
load task did not influence the development of anger, evoked by the unfair distributions. 
3.4 Punishment behaviour 
In order to test whether high compared to low cognitive load during the emotion activation 
phase reduced punishment, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with distribution as 
within subjects-factor, and load and phase as between-subject factors. The same procedure is 
performed to test the second hypothesis; high cognitive load during the application phase 
increases punishment compared to low cognitive load. Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was 
significant (p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is applied. 
The main effect of distribution on punishment behaviour was significant, F(1.655, 
324.362) = 229.68, p < .001. The partial eta-squared (
2
p  = .54) was of large size. The results 
of pairwise comparisons showed that in case of the slightly unfair distribution, the punishment 
was the lowest (M = 2.71, SD = .22, p < .001), followed by the quite unfair distribution (M = 
4.80, SD = .29, p < .001), and that punishment was the highest in case of the severe unfair 
distribution (M = 7.45, SD = .36, p < .001). 
The main and interaction effects of load and phase on punishment were not significant, 
ps > .31. Thus, punishment behaviour was influenced by the unfairness of the distribution, but 
the timing and amount of load did not significantly affect the punishment behaviour of the 
participants in this study. 
Section 4. Discussion 
In this section, the results of the study will be presented, along with a discussion of the 
implications of these results. Next, some limitations of the current study and directions for 
further research will be discussed. This section is completed by some concluding remarks. 
4.1 Summary of the results 
In this master thesis, the objective was to demonstrate that the timing of cognitive load 
influences punishment behaviour, with the emotion anger as an important contributing factor. 
The punishment behaviour is evoked by unfairness, through the distribution of ten euros 
between player A and the participant. The distribution of money served as a proximate for 
different levels of the other player’s unfair behaviour. Two hundred participants were 
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randomly assigned to one of the four research condition. We manipulated both timing 
(activation phase vs. application phase) and occupation of working memory (high load vs. low 
load). Following the distribution of money by player A, participants decide whether or not to 
punish player A. We hypothesized that high load during the emotion activation phase would 
lead to less punishment compared to low load. In addition, we hypothesized that high load 
during the emotion application phase would lead to more punishment. 
 
Overview of the results. The results of this study showed that the unfair distributions led to 
the emotion anger, and subsequently to punishment behaviour. After each game (i.e., 
distributions) participants were asked to indicate their anger by answering four questions. The 
punishment that participants could give their opponent after each game, was measured by the 
amount of minutes (with a maximum of 15) the participant decided to assign to their opponent 
to perform an additional task. The participants were under the impression that they were 
playing each game against another participant. In fact, all decisions of the opponents were 
pre-programmed, whereas the punishment decisions were made by the participants. 
 The anger was the highest in case of the severe unfair distribution (i.e., distribution of 
ten euro: 9 for opponent and 1 for the participant), and lowest in case of the slighty unfair 
distribution (i.e., distribution of ten euro: 6 for opponent and 4 for the participant). After 
analysing the load conditions, the study revealed that anger only differed significantly 
between the low and high load condition in case of the slighty unfair distribution. 
Specifically, participants in the low load conditions experienced more anger, than participants 
in the high load conditions. 
 Corresponding to the findings of the relationship between unfairness and anger, 
punishment behaviour was also the highest in case of the severe unfair distribution, and 
lowest in case of the slighty unfair distribution. Load did not have a significant effect on 
punishment behaviour. 
 Next, the timing of the load did not have a significant effect on either the reported 
anger or the punishment behaviour of the participants. The results and their implications are 
described in detail below. 
 
Implications and discussion. Results of this study showed that the more unfair the behaviour 
of the opponent was, the more anger the participant experienced and the more punishment the 
participant imposed on this opponer. This is in line with previous research, in which this 
positive relation between unfair behaviour of opponers and punishment behaviour of 
participants is found, and was mediated by the experience of the emotion anger (Bosman, & 
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van Winden, 2002; Fehr, & Gächter, 2002; Seip, E.C., van Dijk, W.W. & Rotteveel, M., 
2014, Study 1). Moreover, the study has indeed revealed that the emotion anger has been 
evoked to a greater extent in case of the most unfair distribution, in comparison to the 
slightly- and quite unfair distributions. But, only in the case of the slightly unfair distribution, 
participants reported significantly more anger under low load than under high load. A possible 
explanation could be that the slightly unfair distribution is perceived as ambiguous. Therefore, 
the unfairness of this distribution is possibly experienced less strongly for participants for 
whom their cognitive ability is depleted (high load condition), and stronger for the 
participants who had their full attention on this distribution (low load condition). It seems that 
participants need working memory to perceive the slightly unfair situation as an unfair act of 
their opponent, and ambiguous situations needs more working memory to process, than 
clearly unfair situations. Research on working memory capacity supports this idea. Barrett, 
Tugade and Engle (2004) found that individuals with high working memory capacity are 
better able to evaluate and integrate information in complex situations that require making a 
decision about how to behave, than individuals with low working memory capacity.  
 Next, we argued that, because of occupation of working memory during the emotion-
evoking-situation (e.g., activation phase), anger would be elicited less, and as a result this 
would not affect punishment behaviour. In addition, when occupation of working memory 
took place after the emotion-evoking-situation (e.g., application phase) anger would already 
have been elicited and as a result would affect punishment behaviour. This line of reasoning 
was largely based on literature on stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
results of this study showed that the timing of the load task had no significant effect on the 
reported anger and subsequently the punishment behaviour of the participants. This means 
that there was no difference in anger (as result of the unfair distributions), or punishment 
behaviour, between the participants who performed the load task during the activation phase 
(remembering digits while seeing the unfair distribution), or during the application phase 
(remembering digits while punishing their opponent).  
 Finally, it is interesting to observe that participants made significantly more mistakes 
in case of the severe unfair distribution, compared to the slightly and quite unfair 
distributions. Thus, the severe unfair behaviour of the opponent influenced the participant’s 
own performance on the load task. This result seems to be in contrast to former research, 
which has shown that anger indeed interferes with task performance, but that this interference 
was completely eliminated by high perceptual load (Yates, Ashwin & Fox, 2010). On the 
other hand, research on negative emotional states, has found that emotions reduce task-related 
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processing resources (Meinhardt, J. & Pekrun, R., 2003). Besides, anger has a strong ability to 
capture attention. Research has shown that all emotional stimuli have the strength to grab 
attention more so than do neutral stimuli (Derryberry, & Tucker, 1994; Pratto, & John, 1991). 
In general, it can be assumed that emotions direct attention toward the object of emotion. 
Therefore, processing the emotion anger which is evoked by the unfair distribution probably 
demanded more attention than the performance on the load task. 
4.2 Limitations and future research 
In this subsection some limitations of the study are discussed. After this section, directions are 
given for future research on this topic. 
 
 The aim of this study was to demonstrate that the timing of cognitive load influences 
punishment behaviour, with the emotion anger as an important contributing factor. We were 
unable to show that timing of load had the proposed effect on the punishment behaviour of the 
participants. This does not mean that such a distinction in the timing of load and subsequently 
differences in behavioural outcomes does not exist. As discussed before, it is possible that this 
is due to the attention that is taken away from the load task, because of the emotion 
component which is highly present during the games. The unfair behaviour of the opponent 
evoked anger, and it is possible that the participants focused their attention more on this anger 
than on the load task. A way to prevent this possible issue in future research, is to reward the 
participants’ performance on the load task, which we did not in our study. This could be a 
way to ensure that attention will be more focused on the load task, instead of the unfair 
situation that evokes anger.  
 A second limitation of our study pertains to the sample on which our conclusions are 
based. First of all, the participants of this study are all highly educated individuals, who share 
a similar cultural background. This study is largely based on literature on social norms, which 
vary widely by culture and time (e.g., Bendor, & Swistak, 2001). Although the relationship 
between unfairness and anger is universal, its impact on punishment behaviour may depend 
on culture. Future studies should take these cultural differences in social norms into account, 
in order to make the research results more generalizable. 
 Finally, although our results support the indirect relationship between anger and 
punishment behaviour, this relation does not always have to be present. Some situations do 
not motivate individuals to punish the unfair behaviour of others. As described before, 
punishment can be used as tool to correct an unfair outcome, to correct the behaviour of 
others, or to harm individuals to gain pleasure (de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, 
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Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck, & Fehr, 2004). If these motivations are not present, or fear of 
future consequences plays a role, the tendency to punish can be inhibited. Anger can still be 
the dominating emotion that individuals experience, but the emotion will not lead to 
punishment behaviour. Moreover, behaviour of individuals is strongly influenced by social 
norms (Cialdini, Demaine, Sagarin, Barret, Rhoads, et al., 1991). When forgiveness 
predominates the social standards, unfair behaviour probably does not result in punishment 
behaviour, even though the emotion anger is experienced. At last, punishing others can also 
be a common way of reacting to unfair behaviours of others. In this case, people can choose to 
punish, even though anger is not experienced. Future research could examine the relation 
further between social norms and its impact on the development of anger and punishment 
behaviour. 
4.3 Conclusion 
This study aimed to demonstrate that timing of cognitive load influences punishment 
behaviour. An attempt was made to make a distinction between the development of the 
emotion anger and subsequently punishment behaviour, when cognitive load is given during 
an unfair situation or during the possibility of punishing the opponent. Although this 
difference did not come forward in this study, the link between unfairness, anger and 
punishment behaviour is strongly demonstrated once again. We can conclude that behaviour 
of people in joint ventures, in which people are placed against each other, can be influenced 
by the experience of unfairness of the situation. The operating underlying mechanism is that 
unfairness (i.e., behaviour of others that deviates from the social norm) induces anger, and 
this anger subsequently results in punishment behaviour. 
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